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Stock Dividends—Life-tenant or Remainderman
By L. L. Briggs

Shares of corporation stock are often held by an estate under a
will in which the testator provides that the income of the estate is
to go to a party called a life-tenant as long as that person lives and
at his death the principal passes to another party known as a
remainderman. Whether the former or the latter is entitled to
stock dividends on such stock is an extremely difficult question
to decide and it is one which has caused the courts of the United
States and of England much trouble for more than a century.
There is considerable variation in the decisions of the courts of the
several states, and to make the subject more perplexing, there are
inconsistent rulings within the same jurisdiction. This conflict of
authority is probably due in part to the unusual amount of litiga
tion between tenants for life and remaindermen in respect to this
kind of dividend and in part to the fact that the business corpora
tion is such a comparatively recent development in our economic
structure that there has been a lack of precedents in the common
law to guide the jurists in making their decisions. However, four
fairly well-defined rules have been developed by the courts,
namely: the American or Pennsylvania, the Massachusetts, the
Kentucky and the English rule.
Under the American or Pennsylvania rule, the time with rela
tion to the life term in which the profits being capitalized by the
stock dividend were earned determines whether the life-tenant
or the remainderman is entitled to the distribution. The courts
may inquire as to the time and method of accumulation of such
profits (Soehnlein v. Soehnlein (1911) 146 Wis. 330). They may
look into the facts, circumstances and nature of the transaction
and determine the nature of the dividend and the rights of the
contending parties according to justice and equity (Matter of
Osborne (1913) 209 N. Y. 450). If the entire fund was accumu
lated before the beginning of the life estate, the stock dividend
goes to the remainderman (Smith's Estate (1891) 140 Pa. 344);
while if the profits capitalized by the declaration of the dividend
were earned subsequent to the inception of the life estate, the
distribution belongs to the life-tenant (Lord v. Brooks (1872) 52
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N. H. 72). According to Justice Marshall in Soehnlein v. Soehnlein (1911) 146 Wis. 330:
“In disposing of stock or property dividend as between
tenant and remainderman the court may properly inquire as
to the time when the fund out of which the extraordinary
dividend is to be paid was earned or accumulated, and also
as to the method of accumulation. If it is found to have
accrued or been earned before the estate arose it may be held
to be principal; and, without reference to the time when it is
declared or made payable, to belong to the corpus of the
estate and not go to the life-tenant. But when it is found
that the fund, out of which the dividend is paid, accrued or
was earned, not before, but after the life estate arose, then it
may be held that the dividend is income and belongs to the
life-tenant.”

The justice who gave the decision in Matter of Heaton (1915) 89
Vt. 550, stated the rule in the following words:
“By the rule we adopt, the life-tenant receives all the
profits of the corporation accumulated during the life of the
trust which are released from corporate control and dis
tributed among the stockholders during the life tenancy, re
gardless of the form of the distribution; and the remainder
man receives at the end of the term the corpus of the trust
fund undiminished in value from what it was at the inception
of the trust, which is all that he can justly claim, unless the
creator of the trust has evidenced an intention that he shall
receive more. It works out exact justice between the parties
and, we believe, will more often give effect to the unexpressed
intention of the testator.”
In case the earnings were accumulated partly before and partly
after the beginning of the life estate, the stock dividend must be
divided between the tenant for life and the remainderman, the
former taking the stock representing the portion of profits earned
after the creation of the trust fund and the latter the part which
was earned before that date. Justice Chase, in Matter of Osborne
(1913) 209 N. Y. 450, said:
“Extraordinary dividends, payable from the accumulated
earnings of the company, whether payable in cash or stock,
belong to the life beneficiary, unless they intrench in whole
or in part upon the capital of the trust fund as received from
the testator or maker of the trust or invested in the stock; in
such case such extraordinary dividends should be returned to
the trust fund or apportioned between the trust fund and the
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life beneficiary in such a way as to preserve the integrity of
the trust fund.”
Justice Chase, in the same case, gave the following definite direc
tions for the apportionment of the dividend between the parties:
“The intrinsic value of the trust investment is to be ascer
tained by dividing the capital and the surplus of the corpora
tion existing at the time of the creation of the trust by the
number of shares of the corporation then outstanding, which
gives the value of each share, and that amount must be
multiplied by the number of shares held in the trust. The
value of the investment represented by the original shares
after the dividend has been made is ascertained by exactly
the same method. The difference between the two shows
the impairment of the corpus of the trust. ... If the divi
dend is in stock the amount of impairment in money must be
divided by the intrinsic value of a share of the new stock and
the quotient gives the number of shares to be retained to
make the impairment good—the remaining shares going to
the life beneficiary.”
The presumption is that every stock dividend is from earnings
since the creation of the life estate and consequently goes to the
life-tenant (Matter of Leask (1913) 159 N. Y. App. Div. 102). Ac
cording to Justice Potter in Matter of Robinson (1907) 218 Pa.
St. 481:

“We may conclude therefore on principle that presump
tively every dividend ... in new shares, goes to him who
was the beneficial holder of the shares at the time when it
was declared. This will carry every dividend presumptively
to the life-tenant instead of to the remainderman.”
The remainderman is entitled to what the stock was actually
worth when the trust was created (Appeal of Boyer (1909) 224 Pa.
St. 144). In Gilkey v. Paine (1888) 80 Me. 319, the court said:

“The effort in this country has been generally to maintain
the integrity of the capital and to give all surplus earnings,
in whatever form distributed, to the life-tenant. And,
perhaps, no better rule than this can be adopted.”
However, the burden of proof is upon the remainderman to show
that the principal has been impaired by the stock dividend (Kalback v. Clark (1907) 133 Iowa 215). If he is unable to prove this
to the satisfaction of the court he will not be entitled to any of
the dividend.
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Where there is no accumulation of earnings and a stock dividend
is declared from surplus representing appreciation of the assets
of the corporation, the remainderman is entitled to the distribu
tion. Such distribution in these circumstances is justified by the
court, in Kalback v. Clark (1907) 133 Iowa 215, in the following
words:
“If, however, the so-called stock dividends represent the
corporate capital—that is, represent nothing but the natural
growth or increase in the value of the permanent property,
so that there is merely a change in the form of ownership—
such stock should go to the remainderman; for in such case
the dividend is a dividend of capital, representing simply an
increase in the value of the physical property, goodwill or
other things of tangible value.”

The decision of Kalback v. Clark was followed by the court in
Poole v. Union Trust Company (1916) 191 Mich. 162, and has been
followed by the courts of several other states. In Holbrook v.
Holbrook (1907) 74 N. H. 201, it was held to make no difference
whether the increase in value of the assets occurred before or after
the creation of the trust.
There is some conflict of authority among the states following
the American rule as to whether the court need accept the state
ment of the board of directors as to the source of dividends when
the apportionment of them between life-tenant and remainderman
is the problem for solution. In Matter of Northern Central Rail
way Dividend Cases (1915) 126 Md. 16, the court held that the
declaration of the corporation that the dividend represents profits
must be followed by the court in deciding whether a stock divi
dend is corpus or income. A few years later, a California court
(Matter of Duffil's Estate (1919) 180 Cal. 748) decided that the
determination of the directors of a corporation as to the sources
of its dividends has no binding or persuasive effect upon the court
when it is required to decide whether a stock dividend is corpus
or income in order to determine its ownership as between tenant
for life and remainderman.
The Massachusetts courts have adopted the rule that the intent
of the corporation as shown by its votes in declaring the dividend
determines whether such distribution is an apportionment of
additional stock or a division of profits among the stockholders
(Rand v. Hubbell (1874) 115 Mass. 461). The declaration of a
stock dividend shows the intention of the corporation to retain
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its profits as capital: consequently, the remainderman is entitled
to the shares distributed. According to Chief Justice Chapman in
the leading case of Minot v. Paine (1868) 99 Mass. 101:

“The money in the hands of the directors may be income
to the corporation; but it is not so to a stockholder until a
dividend is made; and, where the company invests it in
buildings and machinery, or in railroad tracks, depots, rolling
stock, or any other permanent improvements, for enlarging
or carrying on their legitimate business, it never becomes
income to the shareholder. The investment becomes an
accretion to capital; and it is equally so whether they increase
the number of shares, or the par value of the shares, or leave
the shares unaltered.”
The rights of the life-tenant and the remainderman are deter
mined by what part of the property is held in the business as a
fund to be used to advance the interests of the company and what
part is permanently separated from the business and turned over
to the stockholders (D'Ooge v. Leeds (1900) 176 Mass. 558). The
court, in Lyman v. Pratt (1903) 183 Mass. 58, said:

“The real question is whether the distribution made by the
corporation is of money to be taken and used as income, or of
capital to be retained in some form as an investment in the
corporation.”
In brief, all stock dividends, whenever earned and however
declared, are considered to be capital and as such they pass to the
remainderman. According to the court in Leland v. Hayden
(1869) 102 Mass. 542:

“We must regard the principle as settled, that stock divi
dends are to be regarded as principal ...”
Chief Justice Chapman, in Minot v. Paine (1868) 99 Mass. 101,
said:
“A simple rule is to regard . . . stock dividends, however
large, as capital.”

The court, in Coolidge v. Grant (1925) 251 Mass. 352, made the
following statement:
“Cash dividends, however large, are regarded as income,
and stock dividends, however made, as capital.”
Seeing the unfairness of this rule, but feeling compelled by the
doctrine of stare decisis to follow it, several Massachusetts courts
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have taken pains to justify their actions. In Rand v. Hubhell
(1874) 115 Mass. 461, the court maintained that:

“It would be impracticable for the courts, in determining
the comparative rights of different persons in a particular
share of stock, to go behind the votes of the corporation and
its directors, and investigate the accounts and affairs of the
corporation, in order to ascertain how the corporation ac
quired the funds out of which the dividend was declared.”
Another defense of the rule was given in Smith v. Dana (1905)
77 Conn. 543:

“It was not pretended that this rule, which has been com
monly known as the Massachusetts rule, was the ideal rule of
reason; nor have the courts of high authority which have
given their approval of it ever claimed it to be such, or one
which would accomplish exact justice under all circumstances.
What has been claimed for it is that its general application,
at least if due regard be had for the substance and intention
of the transaction, would prove more beneficial in its conse
quences, and on the whole tend to results more closely ap
proximating to what was just and equitable than would the
application of any other rule or any attempt to go behind the
declaration of the dividend to search out and discover the
equities of each case according to some theoretical ideal.”

Realizing the injustice that would result from a strict adherence
to the rule, several Massachusetts courts have dared to ignore
the force of precedent and have declined to follow it in certain
hard cases. In Heard v. Eldredge (1872) 109 Mass. 258, the court
said:
“The suggestion that the intention of the directors should
determine the question whether the dividend is capital or
income can not be correct. . . . It is more safe to look at the
character of the property and the transaction.”
The courts in Gray v. Hemenway (1912) 212 Mass. 239 and
Smith v. Cotting (1918) 231 Mass. 42 did not follow the Massa
chusetts rule.
The Massachusetts rule has the advantage of simplicity and
convenience in application. The corporation, by declaring the
dividend in the form of stock, decides for the trustee of the estate
that the distribution is from capital and consequently goes to the
remainderman. The trustee is relieved of the task of applying
to the court for instructions as to the method of handling it.
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However, in many cases, this arbitrary rule is certain to work
great injustice. The corporation may, in the absence of restrain
ing statute, treat all its undivided earnings as capital by issuing
stock dividends to represent the increase in surplus. Since, by
this rule, the remainderman is entitled to stock dividends, the
tenant for life would receive nothing, with the result that the in
tention of the testator would, in many instances, be defeated.
This doctrine confuses capital of the estate with capital of the
corporation and when it permits the board of directors of a cor
poration to decide the ownership of dividends as between life
tenant and remainderman it takes away from the courts the power
of dispensing justice after a view and consideration of the facts
of the case.
The Kentucky rule in regard to stock dividends declared out of
earnings is that they are income and go to the tenant for life re
gardless of whether such capitalized profits were accumulated
before or after the beginning of the trust estate in the stock upon
which the distribution is made (Cox v. Gaulbert (1912) 148 Ky.
407). In Hite v. Hite (1892) 93 Ky. 257, the court said:

“It is the rule as settled by the current of authority that
dividends ... of stock . . . are non-apportionable, and
must be considered as accruing in their entirety as of the date
when they are declared ... No inquiry will in such case
be made as to what portion of the profit upon which the
dividend was based was earned before or after the death of
the testator for the purpose of apportioning between the
tenant for life and the remainderman. The difficulty attend
ing such an inquiry, the impossibility of attaining accuracy,
and of ascertaining the many sources from which the profit
has been derived, are the reasons for the rule.”
According to the early English rule, all ordinary stock dividends
became the property of the life-tenant and all extraordinary dis
tributions of stock went to the trust fund to be turned over to the
remainderman at the death of the life beneficiary (Brander v.
Brander (1799, Ch.) 4 Ves. Jr. 800). There is no evidence of in
vestigation on the part of the courts to determine whether the
profits upon which these dividends were based were earned before
or after the life-tenancy began. The reasons for the adoption of
such an arbitrary doctrine seem to have been the practical ease of
application and the inconvenience of examining the corporation’s
records. It has been said that at least one English decision im
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plies that its confirmation may have been due to pressure brought
by the Bank of England when the court intimated its intention to
examine the books of that institution in order to obtain informa
tion needed for the purpose of apportioning dividends between
rival claimants (Irving v. Houston (1803, house of lords) 4 Paton
521). The rule was obviously unfair to the life-tenant, and while
it was recognized in England as late as 1856, there were many
departures from it even among the earlier cases and at the present
time it is practically obsolete in that country.
The modern English doctrine is very similar to the Massa
chusetts rule. The rights of the life-tenant and the remainder
man to a dividend are based on the arbitrary distinction between
cash and stock dividends, the former going to the tenant for life
if declared after the creation of the trust although they were
earned before that time (Bates v. Mackinley (1862) 31 Beav. 280)
while the latter become the property of the remainderman, except
in cases of companies that cannot legally increase their capital
stock (Bouch v. Sproule (1887, house of lords) 12 App. Cas. 385).
The English jurists maintain that profits of the corporation are
not necessarily earnings or income of the trust. The directors
have control of the corporation’s affairs and they may treat the
profits as suitable for distribution in cash or for the increase of
capital and their decision is final. Consequently, the corpora
tion, by the form in which it declares the dividend, determines the
ownership as between the tenant for life and the remainderman.
Vice-chancellor Sir W. Page-Wood, in Re Barton's Estate (1868)
L. R. 5 Eq. 238, said:

“As long as the company have the profit of the half year
in their hands, it is for them to say what they will do with it,
subject, of course, to the rules and regulations of the com- pany. . . . The dividend to which a tenant for life is entitled is the dividend which the company chooses to declare. . . . Where the company, by a majority of their votes, have said
that they will not divide its money, but turn it all into capital,
capital it must be from that time.”
The American or Pennsylvania rule seems to be most popular
in our country. It is followed by the courts of California, Dela
ware, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Vermont, Wisconsin, and Hawaii. The Massachusetts rule is
supported by a decision of the United States supreme court
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(Gibbons v. Mahon (1890) 136 U. S. 549); it has been enacted by
statute in Georgia, and is followed by the courts of Connecticut,
Illinois, Maine, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, West Vir
ginia and Wyoming. At the present time, Kentucky is alone in
following the rule which bears its name, although up to 1913 it
was favored by the courts of New York. As far as the writer has
been able to ascertain, the question of ownership of stock divi
dends as between life-tenant and remainderman has not come
before the supreme courts of the states which have not been
mentioned.
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